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INTRODUCTION
The United States boasts a bigger entertainment industry than
any other country,1 with Los Angeles regarded as the entertainment capital of the world.2 Accounts differ as to the explanation for
California’s rise to entertainment prominence. One version
attributes the flocking to the west coast as a product of Cecil B.
DeMille’s last-minute location change for The Squaw Man in 1914
to Los Angeles; but, by 1910, movies had already been filmed in the
area.3 Another explanation focuses on Thomas Edison, who operated in New York and New Jersey, and exerted a significant
amount of control over the industry in its early days because he
held many patents on the technologies necessary to make movies.4
Edison created the Motion Picture Patent Company (“MPPC”),
which essentially established a monopoly on all aspects of filmmaking by limiting the sale of necessary items to its members.5 Producers who did not join the MPPC and pay the associated fees in order
to use the technologies would likely be sued for using Edison’s
1

The Media & Entertainment Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA,
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/media-entertainment-industryunited-states [http://perma.cc/DMZ9-6ZLE] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (noting that the
United States’ media and entertainment industry comprised of “businesses that produce
and distribute motion pictures, television programs and commercials, along with music
and audio recordings, radio, games, and publishing.”).
2
L.A. CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY AND THE LOS
ANGELES COUNTY ECONOMY 1 (Nov. 2012), http://laedc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
04/EntertainmentinLA.pdf [http://perma.cc/DL69-A87S].
3
See The History of the Hollywood Movie Industry, HISTORY COOPERATIVE (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-the-hollywood-movie-industry [http://perma.cc/
GS32-494H] [hereinafter History of Hollywood].
4
See Dan Lewis, Thomas Edison Drove the Film Industry to California, MENTAL FLOSS
(July 16, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/51722/thomas-edison-drovefilm-industry-california [http://perma.cc/P58F-YES2].
5
See id.
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technologies.6 Thus, many early filmmakers decided to leave the
east coast for California, where judges were less sympathetic to
Edison and the power of his patents.7 Regardless of the historical
explanation, cinema in America took off in popularity, establishing
“Hollywood,” the neighborhood where movie studios had set up
shop, as synonymous with the industry itself.8
Coincidentally, the birth of the music industry is also owed in
part to Edison; his discovery of the phonograph in late 1877 began
the cultural phenomenon of recorded music that continues today.9
Unlike the film industry’s Hollywood, no single region became the
home of American music, as many major cities had at least one
phonograph company to make recordings and many nickelodeons,
establishments at which a person could listen to music for a nickel
per song.10 Still, despite the prevalence of popular music genres in
many American cities,11 the “Big Three,”—Sony Music Group
(“Sony”), Universal Music Group (“UMG”), and Warner Music
Group (“WMG”)—represent a large share of the music market;12
many well-known, though seemingly smaller, regional record labels
actually fall under the corporate umbrella of one of these three
players.13 Of these, UMG’s headquarters is located in California,14
6

See id.
See id.
8
See History of Hollywood, supra note 3.
9
Thomas
Edison
and
the
First
Phonograph,
AMERICA’S
LIBRARY,
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb_recon_phongrph_1.html
[http://perma.cc/AK2K-LZYR] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
10
See Alex Cosper, History of Record Labels and the Music Industry, PLAYLIST
RESEARCH, http://www.playlistresearch.com/recordindustry.htm [http://perma.cc/
F9Q4-YD53] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
11
For example, we often associate Nashville as the center of country music, Detroit as
the birthplace of Motown, and Seattle as the home to “grunge” rock, to name a few
American regions tied to popular music genres. See Richard Florida, The Geography of
America’s Music Scenes, CITYLAB (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/design/2012/
08/geography-americas-music-scenes/2709 [http://perma.cc/6E7B-RWGW].
12
As of mid-2014, the Big Three controlled eighty-nine percent of global music sales.
See Matt Pollock, Three Huge Record Labels Are Preparing to Take a Lot of Money From
Their Artists, MIC (July 17, 2014), http://mic.com/articles/93502/three-huge-recordlabels-are-preparing-to-take-a-lot-of-money-from-their-artists [http://perma.cc/CUK7AA92].
13
For a complete listing of each of these brands’ subsidiary labels, visit their websites:
Labels, SONY MUSIC GROUP, http://www.sonymusic.com/labels [http://perma.cc/
9UZF-ETZU] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); Our Labels & Brands, UNIVERSAL MUSIC
7
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and Sony and WMG are both headquartered in New York.15 Thus,
most recording contracts by major labels are signed in, or otherwise
made subject to, the laws of California or New York.16
This Note focuses on the effects of a provision in section 2855
of the California Labor Code. The history of this statute is important to understand the impact the statute has had on the entertainment industry, but more specifically, the music industry. Section
2855(a) limits the length of time personal service employment contracts may be enforced to a period of seven years, which is why the
entire statute is often referred to as the “Seven Year Rule.”17 It
states that a contract for personal service of a “special, unique, unusual, extraordinary, or intellectual character,” like those in the
entertainment industry, “cannot be enforced against the employee
beyond the term of seven years from the commencement of service
under it.”18
Initially enacted in 1872 as section 1980 of the California Civil
Code, the law originally prohibited employers from enforcing con-

GROUP, http://www.universalmusic.com/labels [http://perma.cc/V4NV-NHPT] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2015); Services, WARNER MUSIC GROUP, http://www.wmg.com/
services#artists-services [http://perma.cc/HC9L-VT9U] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
14
Universal Music Group’s corporate headquarters is located in Santa Monica,
California. See Contact Us, UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, http://www.universalmusic.com/
contact-us [http://perma.cc/5XH2-FMES] (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).
15
Sony Music Group’s headquarters is located in New York, New York, see FAQ,
SONY MUSIC GROUP, http://www.sonymusic.com/faq/#seven [http://perma.cc/XJ3K8Z6L] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015), as is Warner Music Group’s, see Culture, WARNER
MUSIC GROUP, http://www.wmg.com/culture#contact [http://perma.cc/7ZMT-YTBX]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
16
See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE
DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 5 (8th ed. 2000) (noting that even in the case
of New York music contracts, major record labels include a “duration provision” that is
the same in New York or California).
17
The statute is also referred to as the “De Haviland Law” after actress Olivia de
Havilland (those who refer to the law after Ms. de Havilland often spell her last name the
same way as it appears in the case citation: incorrectly), who brought a suit against
Warner Brothers to end her exclusive contract with the studio after seven years had
lapsed. See infra Part I.A.2.
18
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (2014); see also De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 229 (1944) (holding that section 2855’s “seven year” limitation on
personal service contracts must be measured in calendar years, not in terms of actual
service) (emphasis added).
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tracts of personal service after two years.19 In 1931, the statute was
amended to increase the term to seven years.20 Finally, six years later, section 1980 was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor Code
was enacted, which adopted and streamlined the language of the
old provision.21 For fifty years, section 2855 did not change at all;
even now, nearly eighty years later, the Seven Year Rule is an “accepted tenet of entertainment law,” a “given” in contract negotiations.22
In 1987, however, the California legislature amended the statute to add an additional subsection, which will be the focus of this
Note. This music industry-specific amendment, section 2855(b),
represents a “carve out”23 that essentially exempts musicians from
protection under the statute.24 Part I of this Note will explain the
legislative history of section 2855 and related lawsuits in order to
contextualize the 1987 amendment within the entertainment industry. It will also give a brief background on the nature of recording
contracts and explore the typical structure of a deal between musicians and labels. Part II will examine the conflicts between different
areas of contract law that arise from the amendment, including the
freedom to contract, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and
inequity in bargaining power between parties. Lastly, Part III will
outline potential solutions to resolve conflicts created by the law,
including two possible amendments to section 2855(b), and repealing section 2855(b) altogether. Ultimately, I argue that the best op-

19

GREGG B. RAMER, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, PERSONAL SERVICE WITH A
SMILE: A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA’S “SEVEN-YEAR” RULE 1 (2013),
http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/48984_Spotlight_on_Entertainment_and_Media%20L
aw_Personal_Service_With_a%20Smile_A_History_of_Californias_Seven_Year_Rule.
pdf [http://perma.cc/SLZ5-LZT5]; see also LAB. § 2855.
20
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 1.
21
Id. at 2.
22
See Matthew Belloni, De Havilland Lawsuit Resonates Through Hollywood, REUTERS
(Aug. 23, 2007, 11:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/24/industrylawsuit-dc-idUSN2329585820070824 [http://perma.cc/FD7Z-55KF].
23
See Sarah Brouillette, The False Freedom of Rock Stardom, REVIEWS IN CULTURAL
THEORY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.reviewsinculture.com/ [http://perma.cc/C3AL97AA] (reviewing MATT STAHL, UNFREE MASTERS: POPULAR MUSIC AND THE POLITICS
OF WORK (2012)).
24
See infra Part II.C.
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tion for ensuring fair outcomes is repealing section 2855(b) through
collective action of recording artists.
I. PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA
A. History of Section 2855
1. Enactment and Early Amendments
In 1872, the California legislature passed section 1980 of the
Civil Code, which stated,
A contract to render personal service, other than a
contract of apprenticeship . . . cannot be enforced
against the employee beyond the term of two years
from the commencement of service under it; but if
the employee voluntarily continues his service under it beyond that time, the contract may be referred
to as affording a presumptive measure of the compensation.25
Of course, this early version of section 2855 predates what we
know now as Hollywood,26 however, the desire to limit a term of
personal service is perhaps best contextualized in a post-Civil War
America.27 Over the next several decades, the statute adapted to
match the burgeoning entertainment industry;28 in 1931, the statute
was amended to include the phrase “special, unique, unusual, extraordinary, or intellectual” in qualifying the kind of personal ser-

25

See RAMER, supra note 19, at 1.
See Lewis, supra note 4; see also History of Hollywood, supra note 3.
27
This point is, admittedly, only subtly alluded to in the introduction of Gregg
Ramer’s very helpful overview of the history of section 2855. See RAMER, supra note 19,
at 1.
28
See History of Hollywood, supra note 3 (“The 1930’s was considered the Golden Age
of Hollywood. A new era in film history began in this decade with the introduction of
sound into film, creating new genres such as musicians, documentaries, social statement
films, comedies, westerns, and horror movies.”).
26
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vice contract under this law.29 Six years later, the statute was recodified and reworded30 with text that has since been unchanged.31
2. De Haviland v. Warner Brothers
The Seven Year Rule was perhaps most famously tested in
1944 in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.32 In 1936, right in
the middle of Hollywood’s “studio system” era,33 a nineteen yearold actress, Olivia de Havilland, signed a seven-year exclusive contract with Warner Brothers Pictures.34 During this time, studios
were highly vertically integrated, enjoyed control over production
and distribution, and relied on long-term star contracts to bolster
their popularity.35 By 1943, after amassing critical acclaim and considerable star-power, de Havilland refused a few roles she was offered by Warner Brothers in order to best serve her reputation and
career aspirations.36 For these refusals and other issues (including
illness) that arose throughout the course of her seven year contract,
she was placed on several suspensions that totaled twenty-five
weeks, which Warner Brothers attempted to tack onto the back end
of her contract.37
De Havilland brought suit against the studio, arguing that her
contract could not be enforced past the seven-year mark, and the
California Court of Appeals agreed.38 The court held that “the
substitution of years of service for calendar years would work a
drastic change of state policy with relation to contracts for personal
29

CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (2014).
See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 230 (1944) (“It
is clear that section 2855 of the Labor Code is a restatement and continuation of former
Civil Code section 1980 and not a new enactment.”).
31
See LAB. § 2855.
32
67 Cal. App. 2d at 225.
33
See Hollywood Studio System Collection (1913-1948), MEDIA HISTORY DIGITAL
LIBRARY, http://mediahistoryproject.org/hollywood [http://perma.cc/2XWB-5G7U]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
34
Matt Stahl, Employee in a Cage? Olivia de Havilland, Warner Bros. Pictures, and the
“Limit Case” of Star Employment, 12 WARWICK ENT. & SPORTS LAW J. ¶ 1 (2011),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume12/stahl/
[http://perma.cc/4UDY-KDU6].
35
See id. ¶ 6; Hollywood Studio System Collection (1913–1948), supra note 33.
36
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 2.
37
See De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 228–29.
38
See id. at 232.
30
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services,” and that the phrase “for a term not beyond a period of
seven years” does not carry a hidden meaning.39 The De Haviland
suit was a “watershed” event in the history of the studio system
era, which “questioned the whole system of hiring stars on term
contracts” and led to “stars wrestling control of their careers from
the studios.”40
3. The Music Industry Amendments
Following the De Haviland ruling, the Seven Year Rule applied
uniformly across the entertainment industry’s many subsets until
1987, when the Recording Industry Association of America
(“RIAA”) and major record labels successfully lobbied the California legislature to amend section 2855.41 Prior to the enactment
of section 2855(b), recording artists would threaten to invoke the
Seven Year Rule in their soon-to-expire record deals, whether or
not there remained unproduced records on the contract.42 Record
labels often responded to these threats by renegotiating the existing
contract, rather than pursuing litigation, to keep the artist at the
label.43 The RIAA and the labels claimed that recording contracts
are unlike other entertainment industry contracts of “unique and
special” nature, as they are not historically tied to a time frame so
much as to the production and delivery of records.44 They also argued that record companies make large investments in artists who
are unfairly enriched by simply walking away from a contract without producing the agreed-upon number of albums.45
The California legislature responded with the introduction of
section 2855(b), which has three subsections.46 Section 2855(b)(1)
establishes that the entire amendment pertains to “[a]ny employee
39

Id.
See Stahl, supra note 34, ¶ 44 (internal citations omitted).
41
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 2–3.
42
See Chuck Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim at Music Industry Contracts, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/08/business/fi-31594 [http://perma.cc/
XGV8-UHJ2] [hereinafter Philips, Lawmakers].
43
See id.
44
RAMER, supra note 19, at 3.
45
Chuck Philips, Courtney Love Seeks To Rock Record Labels’ Contract Policy, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/28/news/mn-31219
[http://perma.cc/K7MT-5D9P] [hereinafter Philips, Courtney Love].
46
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b) (2014).
40
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who is a party to a contract to render personal service in the production of phonorecords,” and imposes a written notice requirement for these parties to seek nonenforcement pursuant to section
2855(a), the Seven Year Rule.47 Section 2855(b)(2) permits the recovery of damages for a breach of contract that occurs during its
term, in an action commenced during or after its term.48 Finally,
section 2855(b)(3) states that a if a party seeking nonenforcement
“is, or could contractually be, required to render personal service
in the production of a specified quantity of the phonorecords and
fails to render all of the required service” prior to giving notice, the
party “damaged by the failure” is permitted to recover damages
for each unproduced record.49
With the enactment of the amendment, however, the labels
were given clear recourse for remuneration in the event an artist
sought to end a contract without producing the agreed-upon number of records.50 Conversely, the amendment represented a “water[ing] down” of musicians’ ability to invoke the Seven Year Rule,
with a “very onerous penalty for exercising rights granted to everyone else under a personal services employment agreement.”51
Thus, over the past twenty-eight years, musicians and other activists have repeatedly asked the California state assembly to repeal
the 1987 amendment.52
47

Id. § 2855(b)(1).
Id. § 2855(b)(2).
49
Id. § 2855(b)(3).
50
See id.
51
William I. Hochberg, A Guide To Understanding the “How’s” and “Why’s” of
Recording Agreements, in 8-159 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS ¶ 159.05[3]
(Donald C. Farber ed., LexisNexis 2015).
52
See, e.g., Corey Moss, Beck, Deftones, Others Rally For Bill That Could Change
Recording Contracts, MTV (Jan. 23, 2002), http://www.mtv.com/news/1451908/beckdeftones-others-rally-for-bill-that-could-change-recording-contracts/
[http://perma.cc/4CU9-K4TQ]; Jennifer Toomey, California State Assembly Regarding
the 7-Year Statute, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, https://futureofmusic.org/filing/
california-state-assembly-regarding-7-year-statute
[https://perma.cc/UEU7-TUDM]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015); Teri Vanhorn, Courtney Love, Don Henley, LeAnn Rimes
Testify on Artists’ Rights, MTV (Sept. 6, 2001), http://www.mtv.com/news/1448678/
courtney-love-don-henley-leann-rimes-testify-on-artists-rights/ [http://perma.cc/CX8H5X23] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (“Courtney Love, Don Henley, and LeAnn Rimes went
to California’s State Capitol Building on Wednesday to complain about record-company
business practices and ask for legislation to free musicians from long-term contracts.”);
see also Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[3] (“California State Senator Kevin Murray
48
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B. Structure of Recording Contracts
Because the music industry is the only subset of the entertainment field that has a “carve out” exception in section 2855, it is
necessary to understand the difference between record deals and
other entertainment contracts. Often, actors and actresses work
with “soft deals,” yet, where a contract does exist, the majority
represent single picture agreements that do not run the risk of violating the Seven Year Rule.53 In the television industry, the rule is
even less likely to cause a problem.54 Television shows that run for
longer than seven years are typically very popular among viewers,
thus, these actors and actresses have considerable leverage with
which to negotiate contracts.55 Finally, and very importantly,
across film and television deals, the relationship between the actors
and actresses and the studios or networks is overwhelmingly not an
exclusive one.56
Thus, musicians’ employment contracts look very different
than those formed by their acting peers.57
introduced into the California legislature SB 1249, the purpose of which was to appeal the
1987 amendment. The proposed state legislation was aggressively fought by the record
industry, whose efforts were coordinated by the [RIAA]. Although the legislation was
stalled, Senator Murray has promised to reintroduce it again and to expand his probe into
record industry practices, particularly focusing on royalty accounting and payment
practices.”).
53
Even in major franchises that require actors and actresses to appear in multiple films,
section 2855 is typically not implicated: either the films are made within the seven-year
timeframe, or the actors and actresses are able to secure highly lucrative compensation
that would prevent them from seeking nonenforcement of a contract.
54
See discussion infra note 189; see also Nellie Andreeva, The Price of Success: Hit Shows
Bracing For Cast Exits & Untimely Cancellations, DEADLINE (Apr. 9, 2015, 2:09 PM),
http://deadline.com/2015/04/cast-members-leaving-shows-renewed-vampire-diaries1201405965 [http://perma.cc/WY75-EBRL] (“Cast contract negotiations are considered
a high-class problem as they are associated with hit series that have gone the distance.”).
55
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 4; see also Andreeva, supra note 54 (noting the
difficulties faced by shows that lose stars after their contracts have ended, and the
increased importance of retaining a star who plays a show’s title character).
56
See, e.g., Susan Murray, I Know What You Did Last Summer: Sarah Michelle Gellar
and Crossover Teen Stardom, in UNDEAD TV: ESSAYS ON BUFFY THE VAMPIRE SLAYER 51–
52 (Elana Levine & Lisa Parks eds., 2007) (discussing the role of film projects in the
career of an actor or actress who has achieved fame in television, and noting that “forays
into film are particularly alluring to audiences during the summer, when network shows
are on hiatus”).
57
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 3.
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The fundamental legal principle in any agreement
between a recording artist and a record company is a
simple copyright transaction: the recording artist
who provides the talent and marketability, convey
his or her rights in the sound recording of his or her
performance to the record company, which provides
the production, distribution, and marketing resources and expertise.58
The copyright-owning label manufactures and sells the product
created by the artist, with whom it shares the revenue, as provided
by contract.59
It is safe to say that movie studios, television networks, production companies, and record labels all assume some financial risk for
their projects. Section 2855(b)(3)’s damages provision only applies
to the music industry, however, which seems to represent the California legislature’s recognition that the industry’s unique structure
warranted greater protection for labels, as they “necessarily make
‘large investments in an artist’s career based primarily on the
promise that the act [will] deliver’ the contractually stipulated
number of albums.”60 Thus, if the musician was permitted to walk
away from the deal without producing the agreed-upon number of
albums, the record company “would be damaged by not receiving
the full value of their ‘investment’ in the artist.”61
This investment in the artist is reflected in the recording contract. A record label does assume the financial risk in production,
distribution, and marketing,62 but treats these expenditures as advances to the artist against future royalties.63 If a record is eventually able to recoup those costs,64 the artist will earn royalties, as stipulated by the contract; if the record is unable to recoup those
58

COREY FIELD & BARRY I. SLOTNICK, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: FORMS & ANALYSIS
§ 4.12 (2014).
59
Id.
60
Note, California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2632, 2636 (2003) (quoting Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42).
61
RAMER, supra note 19, at 3.
62
See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12.
63
Id.
64
The contract typically specifies the types and amounts of the record label’s
“recoupable” costs to be charged against the artist’s royalty account. Id.
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costs, the artist does not have to repay those advances to the label.65 Thus, unsuccessful records financially harm the labels more
than the artists who create them; however, the label also stands to
recoup their costs and profit immensely from successful records.
In addition to this basic, industry-wide structure of the recording contract, other important issues include:
 “The scope of exclusive services the artist must
provide to the label;”
 “The number of projects or ‘albums’ that must
be delivered by the artist pursuant to ‘options’
held by the record company;”
 “The advances payable to the artist for each
album;” and
 The royalties the artist will receive and the
royalty costs for the producer of the
recordings.66
These four major issues help to highlight the differences in the
interests of the record labels and the artists when disputes under
section 2855 arise.
1. Scope of Exclusivity
Recording contracts require that the artist produce recordings
exclusively for the label.67 As discussed above in Part I.A.2, De Haviland represented a victory for the artist and helped end the period
in Hollywood history marked by powerful studios and exclusive
actor contracts.68 During the studio system era, the perception was
that the studio “created” the movie stars: “[they] were recruited
by the studio’s talent scouts, groomed by the studios, and signed to
seven-year contracts.”69 These contracts required the actor- and
actress-employees to participate in social activities and open their
lives to the media.70 After De Haviland, actors and actresses were
65

Id.
Id. (formatting altered).
67
Id. § 4.12[1][a]. Non-exclusive contracts are very unusual in the industry and would
require a different analysis of the fairness of section 2855(b)’s limitations on musicians.
68
See supra note 40.
69
DANIEL NIEMEYER, 1950S AMERICAN STYLE: A REFERENCE GUIDE 63 (2013).
70
See id.
66
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not bound to serve the studio for longer than the maximum term
length;71 because they knew exactly when their contracts were ending, they were able to shop around the industry for better scripts,
directors, and projects.72
After De Haviland, a “free agency” structure began to replace
the studio system as actors and actresses gained more power in negotiating employment contracts based on their fair market value.73
In a free agency market, actors and actresses are not bound to one
studio for an extended, long-term contract, but rather, are free to
create films with whomever they want.74 Today, the benefit of this
system to the actors and actresses is clear, as they can embark on a
project with a clear understanding of its timeline and the preparation and skills required, as well as negotiate their salary or compensation structure based on their market value. They are bound to
studios on a project-by-project basis, rather than for a set length of
time, and with less limited exclusivity provisions: actors and actresses are typically permitted to engage in other business dealings
with other production entities, even while working on another
project.75
71

See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 231–32 (1944).
WHEELER WINSTON DIXON, DEATH OF THE MOGULS: THE END OF CLASSICAL
HOLLYWOOD 20 (2012).
73
See A. Barry Cappello & Troy A. Thielemann, Challenging the Practices of the
Recording Industry, L.A. LAWYER, May 2002, at 14–19, http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/
Vol25No3/1127.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2TJ-MPJJ].
74
DIXON, supra note 72, at 20.
75
Both film and television stars face less restrictive employment relationships with
their networks and studios than musicians and their labels. Still, when selecting additional
television projects, actors and actresses are often limited to appear only on shows on their
television show’s network or network’s affiliates. Compare Janet Kinosian, Academy
Awards: For J.K. Simmons of “Whiplash,” the Beat Never Slows, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015,
8:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/la-et-mn-en-jk-simmonsacademy-awards-20150205-story.html [http://perma.cc/8PJA-338L] (discussing actor
J.K. Simmons’s hectic 2015 award season, which included appearances at many award
shows, filming a movie, and hosting Saturday Night Live), with Dorothy Pomerantz, Joel
McHale Is a Very Busy Man, FORBES (May 18, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
2011/05/17/celebrity-100-11-joel-mchale-community-soup-e-nbc-popularity.html
[http://perma.cc/EG3A-2BNG] (discussing actor Joel McHale’s starring roles in
Community and The Soup, television shows on NBC Universal networks NBC and E!,
respectively, while also appearing in three films and doing standup) and James Hibberd,
ABC Orders Prank Show Inspired by Ellen DeGeneres, ENT. WEEKLY (Jan. 14, 2015, 12:15
PM), http://www.ew.com/article/2015/01/14/abc-ellen-degeneres-prank [http://perma.
72
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, a “360 deal” is fully
broad in scope; it encompasses everything that an artist can hold
rights to and can earn revenue from—including music sales, touring, merchandising, fan-club fees, endorsements, licensing, appearances, and often includes sharing with the artist the publishing
rights for compositions recorded under contract.76 Unlike free
agency, where a person has the ability to negotiate with and enter
into contracts easily, a 360 deal represents a highly exclusive relationship between label and artist.77 Music contracts are increasingly
closer to 360 deals because of the reduction in traditional album
sales from increased online streaming.78
Because the Big Three labels have considerable institutional
power in the industry,79 they are able to set standards for the way
music contracts are constructed.80 Artists lack the ability to negotiate a contract with a major record label from scratch and rather
simply agree to a variation of the standard contract.81 This structure of exclusivity both prevents musicians from negotiating shortcc/L2MA-3VLN] (discussing the launch of an ABC show, Repeat After Me, hosted by
actress Wendi McLendon-Covey, who appears on another ABC show, The Goldbergs).
76
Ian Brereton, Note and Recent Development, The Beginning of A New Age?: The
Unconscionability of the “360-Degree” Deal, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 193
(2009).
77
See id.
78
See Michael Arrington, “360” Music Deals Become Mandatory As Labels Prepare For
Free Music, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 8, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/11/08/360music-deals-become-mandatory-as-labels-prepare-for-free-music
[http://perma.cc/V5DJ-H8Y2].
79
See id. (discussing the evolution of 360 deals from “controversial” and
“experimental” to mandatory, as Warner Music Group adopted the model); see also
Brereton, supra note 76, at 178 (noting that even though the then-“Big Four” stronghold
on the music industry in the United States had declined, bands and artists were still more
likely to achieve commercial success by signing with a major label versus an independent
one); Pollock, supra note 12.
80
See Brereton, supra note 76, at 177–78 (“Even for artists who obtain an attorney, the
standard major label recording agreement can span one hundred pages, containing
legalese and hidden meanings that demand counsel specializing in music law. Such an
agreement is ‘virtually impossible’ for an unrepresented artist to comprehend.
Additionally, these contracts endeavor to protect the major labels at all costs.”).
81
Id. at 178, 182 (noting that “[m]any of the principal terms, through repeated usage,
have come to constitute non-negotiable industry standards or, at best, negotiable within
limits established by the labels over time,” and giving an example of a point that is
“negotiable within limits” as the exact royalty percentage the new artist receives as
typically between ten and twelve percent of the suggested retail list price).

2015]

RESTORING THE SEVEN YEAR RULE

289

term contracts with labels based on the artist’s market value and
protects labels by allowing them to retain control over their artists
who are actually successful.82
2. Term Length; Number of Albums
Another basic industry standard is the term of the agreement:
recording contracts contain an “initial contract period” in which
the artist must produce “one, or at most, two albums,” followed by
multiple, successive options for additional albums.83 The initial
contract period allows the label to assess the commercial viability
of the artist, and reduces its financial risk by allowing the label not
to renew the contract for the option periods.84 If the label exercises
its options, there is no way to determine how long the contract will
actually last, as these are measured in both time and product:85
[After the initial contract period, t]he agreement
then provides the record company with multiple,
successive options that it can exercise in its discretion to cause the artist to record additional product,
with each option calling for a limited amount of
product such as an additional phonograph record album for the option period so exercised. That product then becomes the “minimum delivery requirement” for that particular option period. Each contract period, whether the initial period or an option
period, is generally defined as a period of time consisting of a number of months, usually between seven and eighteen, that follows the delivery of the last
record required to be recorded in satisfaction of the
minimum delivery requirement for that particular
contract period. The actual term of the agreement is
defined as the period commencing from the initial

82

See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
Gary Stiffleman & Bonnie Greenberg, Exclusive Recording Agreements Between An
Artist and A Record Company, in 8-159 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS, supra
note 51, ¶ 159.03[1][a]; see also FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][c].
84
Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][a].
85
Id.
83
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period and continuing to the end of the last option
period.86
Additionally, after the contract is drafted, the label unilaterally
has the power to decide whether to exercise any—or all—of these
options; the artist is bound to the option periods whether or not
doing so remains a beneficial career move.87 Thus, the artist whose
label has exercised these options is obligated to produce the total
number of records designated by the initial contract period plus
those required by the option periods.88
3. Advances Payable to Artist Per Album and Recoupable
Costs
At the start of the initial contract period and the option periods,
record labels pay their artists an advance, which provides both a
salary and upfront money for some production costs.89 Section
3423 of the California Civil Code90 mandates that labels must guarantee artists certain amounts of money each year under contract in
order to bring an action to enjoin the artist in a breach of contract
claim, thus, this money is usually incorporated into the advance.91
86

Id.
Kaleena Scamman, ADR in the Music Industry: Tailoring Dispute Resolution to the
Different Stages of the Artist-Label Relationship, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 269, 281
(2008).
88
Id.; see also FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12. Note that the contract specifies
the option periods in terms of length of time and in delivery requirement. Thus, even if it
is not possible to determine exactly how long a contract will last when it is formed, it is
somewhat easy to determine if it will be able to be completed in seven years by adding the
length of the initial period to the option periods and accounting for industry standards for
the rate at which artists can produce albums. See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42; see
also infra Part II.
89
See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f]; Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra
note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][c]. This money is also referred to as a “recording fund.” Part of the
contract negotiations focus on which production costs are recoupable by the label. FIELD
& SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f], [1][n] (noting that certain costs, like the creation
of music videos, may be covered up to an amount by the label, with the remainder
recoupable against the artist’s royalty account).
90
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (2014).
91
Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[2][a][ii] (explaining section 3423, known as the
“$9,000 Plus Provision,” which contractually requires a label to guarantee the artist
$9,000 by the end of the first contract year, $12,000 by the end of the second contract
year, $15,000 by the end of contract years three through seven, in addition to additional
stipulated payments in years four through seven).
87
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The advances are usually six-figure sums; however, most of that
money is recoupable against the artist’s royalties in the future.92 As
far as the artist can control the expenses of producing the album,
the artist is incentivized to be cost-efficient because he or she can
keep the remaining money as an advance against future royalties.93
Therefore, after the artist is paid the advance, he or she does not
begin to earn royalties until the advance has been earned back.94
Additionally, although the artist is not typically required to pay the
label any amount from the advance that is not earned back in revenue from the album, unsuccessful records can drive artists’ royalty
accounts into deep deficits.95 These advances may be used to recoup losses on a “cross-collateral” basis among all master recordings under the contract: the artist’s advance for one album may be
used to recoup other projects of the artist that were not successful.96 An artist whose record does not perform well—in terms of
sales, touring, licensing, etc.—may not profit at all from the creation of the record, and is either dropped from the label and or left
in debt to begin the next project.97 In sum, each record must be
successful enough, at a bare minimum, to recoup the artists’ advances from the label in order for the artist to remain financially
viable.
4. Artist Royalties and Royalty Costs for Producer of
Recordings
Labels pay royalties to the artist based on record sales, calculated either by using the suggested retail list price (“SRLP”) of the
recordings, or on the net revenue that is actually received by the
label.98 Royalty rates fluctuate throughout an artist’s career and
can range from 8% to 25% of retail prices.99 Artists at the beginning
92

See ARTIFACT (Sisyphus Corporation 2012) (describing the process by which artists
are paid, including 30 Seconds To Mars’ $500,000 advances from EMI that were later
recovered against for costs incurred from album production); see also FIELD & SLOTNICK,
supra note 58, § 4.12.
93
See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12.
94
Id.
95
FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f].
96
See Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][c].
97
See ARTIFACT, supra note 92.
98
See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][i].
99
See Scamman, supra note 87, at 275.
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of their careers may sign contracts for relatively low royalty percentages of the SLRP, with the potential for small percentage “bumpups” for subsequent albums and special incentives for certain sales
performance.100 The calculation of royalties and assessment of a
fair rate is further complicated by technological advancements and
new methods of music consumption: the popularization of streaming music has ushered in new questions on how to effectively monetize these channels at a good royalty rate.101
II. THE PROBLEM WITH SECTION 2855(b)
Although section 2855(b) was enacted nearly thirty years ago,
there is very little case law to predict how California courts would
handle disputes between labels and their musicians, as they are often negotiated and not litigated.102 Circularly, this lack of jurisprudence creates much uncertainty surrounding the potential outcome
of litigation, giving the parties, especially the labels, an even clearer
benefit to resolve the dispute out of court.103 Currently, section
2855(b) is problematic for a few reasons: it grants labels the right to
recover damages for undelivered albums, but gives no further guidance on how these damages should be calculated;104 it was enacted
on the flawed premise that the music industry, as a whole, would
be harmed if labels were not expressly granted this right to recover
100

See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][i].
See Glenn Peoples, Music Streaming Now Generates Trillions of Plays—But Are
Royalties Keeping Up?, BILLBOARD (Aug. 13, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/6663783/music-streaming-now-generates-trillions-of-plays-but-areroyalties-keeping [http://perma.cc/EHZ6-VAMY].
102
See, e.g., RAMER, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that section 2855(b)(3) seems geared to
force settlement); Todd Martens, 30 Seconds to Mars and EMI Make Nice, New Album Due
This Fall, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 28, 2009, 6:48 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
music_blog/2009/04/30-seconds-to-mars-and-emi-make-nice-new-album-due-thisfall.html [http://perma.cc/PK2S-YZPW] (“It certainly is not fun being in litigation. I
would avoid it at all costs.”); Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45 (“Earlier possible
showdowns over the statute, including cases by Beck, Don Henley and Luther Vandross,
were averted when industry attorneys convinced the artists to settle out of court for
multimillion-dollar advances.”).
103
Tracy C. Gardner, Note, Expanding the Rights of Recording Artists: An Argument to
Repeal Section 2855(b) of the California Labor Code, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 721, 756 (2007)
(“Record companies with vast resources may continue to press for settlement in
important cases they fear they may lose to keep these issues safe from judicial review.”).
104
See infra Part II.A.
101
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damages;105 and it unfairly exempts musicians from the longstanding protection of the Seven Year Rule.106
A. Assessment of Damages
Section 2855(b)(3) grants labels the right to recover damages
for each record that is not produced in the event that a recording
artist seeks to end his or her contract under the Seven Year Rule.107
It states:
If a party to a contract described in paragraph (1) [an
artist] is, or could contractually be, required to
render personal service in the production of a specified quantity of the phonorecords and fails to render
all of the required service prior to the date specified
in the notice provided in paragraph (1), the party
damaged by the failure shall have the right to recover
damages for each phonorecord as to which that party has
failed to render service in an action that, notwithstanding paragraph (2), shall be commenced within
45 days after the date specified in the notice.108
Commentators agree that identifying the criteria to determine
damages in a breach of contract action under section 2855(b)(3) is
problematic:
[W]hat are the damages? The actual money that the
record company is out of pocket with respect to the
undelivered records? The record companies don’t
want that; they probably haven’t spent anything,
yet. Lost profits from the undelivered records? Lost
profits are notoriously hard to quantify. Obviously,
undelivered records by bona fide stars theoretically
could mean millions in lost profits.109
These vague terms, like “actual money” spent or “lost profits,” are inherently theoretical when determining the value of a
105
106
107
108
109

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014).
Id. (emphasis added).
RAMER, supra note 19, at 3.
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record that has not yet been produced, marketed, distributed, and
sold.110 Section 2855(b)(3) “seems uniquely geared to forcing settlement,”111 failing to specify any method or guidance for calculating these damages.
A 2008 dispute between 30 Seconds to Mars (“30STM”) and
their label, EMI,112 highlights this problem.113 Directed by the
band’s front man, film star Jared Leto, the 2014 documentary Artifact chronicled the band’s production of their third album,114 as
they grew more and more entrenched in legal battles with EMI that
appeared on-track to see the inside of a courtroom.115 Unhappy
with EMI, the band had attempted to leave the label, based on their
belief that their 1999 contract was no longer enforceable as it was
beyond the seven-year threshold.116 Although the band was allegedly in “millions of dollars of debt” to the label, EMI sued 30STM
for thirty million dollars, pursuant to section 2855(b)(3), as the
band had three undelivered albums remaining on its contract.117
Neither the band nor the label had the ability to review previous
decisions of California courts to predict the possible outcome of the
case, weigh the costs and benefits of litigation, or whether the label
even had standing to sue under section 2855(b)(3).118 Further, the
band believed EMI was using the lawsuit as intimidation to keep
them tethered to their contract, claiming millions of dollars in
damages the label knew 30STM simply could not pay.119
30STM eventually settled the matter with the label in an undisclosed renegotiated agreement and released the album This Is War
110

See Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45; see infra Part III.A.2.
See RAMER, supra note 19, at 3.
112
EMI is no longer an independent record label, and has since been acquired by Sony.
See Ben Sisario, Sony Closes Its Acquisition of EMI Music Publishing, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2012, 9:08 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/passing-finalhurdle-sonys-deal-for-emi-publishing-is-approved-by-u-s [http://perma.cc/F3K8-M2K6].
113
Natalie Robehmed, Jared Leto Wages War On The Music Industry, FORBES (Dec. 4,
2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2013/12/04/jared-letowages-war-on-the-music-industry [http://perma.cc/Y7WN-EQ65].
114
The album is appropriately titled This is War.
115
See ARTIFACT, supra note 92.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014).
119
ARTIFACT, supra note 92.
111
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with EMI.120 Still, in the final seconds of Artifact, the band states
they have “never been paid for the sales of any of their albums,”
but that the label continues to claim the band was in debt to
them.121
Artifact illustrates the narrative of these contractual disputes:
the musician or band provides notice to the label as required by
section 2855(b)(1), then the label responds with a lawsuit claiming
millions of dollars for any unproduced records remaining on contract, which, in turn, initiates negotiation of the parties to settle.122
Labels have the statutory right to recover damages to limit financial
loss caused by unfulfilled, but promised, album delivery.123 However, with no further specification or statutory limitation on damages,
the labels can file multi-million dollar lawsuits against bands whose
finances they closely control.
B. The Reality of the Music Industry124
In lobbying for the 1987 amendment, the RIAA argued that artists would be unfairly enriched if they could simply walk away after
a time period without producing the agreed-upon number of albums.125 The labels claimed they bared the financial risk in signing,
promoting, and marketing their musicians, thus, they argued that
without protection against artists who wanted to jump ship without
fulfilling their contractual duties, they would be detrimentally

120

Id.; see also Martens, supra note 102.
See ARTIFACT, supra note 92.
122
See id.
123
See LAB. § 2855(b)(3); supra discussion Part I.B.
124
This Note focuses the discussion of the “reality” of the music industry on the
feasibility on completing a standard contract within a seven-year frame, in order to
concentrate analysis on the fairness of section 2855(b) and the Seven Year Rule. An
entirely separate Note could focus on the technological advances in music in the past
thirty years to further justify that section 2855(b) needs reform. For example, in 1987,
CDs were the new, popular method of music distribution, which made record companies
with existing libraries of songs very lucrative businesses. See Gardner, supra note 103, at
747. Although the process of creating an album, from start to finish, is very different in
2015 than it was thirty years ago, the industry’s business practices have been slow to
change: recording contracts are still structured as if the physical distribution of music,
through CDs or records, is the primary delivery method to consumers. See Stiffleman &
Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[2][d].
125
See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
121
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harmed.126 Finally, they argued that the Seven Year Rule, in the
context of the music industry, did not recognize that record companies made “large investments in an artist’s career based primarily on the promise that the act would deliver a certain number of
albums under the contract—typically seven recordings,” but that
the labels “don’t earn money on successful artists until after the
fourth album.”127 In practice, however, it is very unlikely that a label would exercise its options on an artist who is not successful by
the second album.128
Artists who seek nonenforcement of their contract deals under
section 2855(a) often note that it is not possible to produce the
number of albums designated by contract within seven years.129
Given that an album “cycle,” the “overall period encompassing
the creation and release of an album, including the subsequent
touring and promotion,” generally takes two to three years, contracts for five to seven albums can take well over a decade to complete.130 Even if an artist wanted to produce an album per year for
seven years in order to complete her contractual obligations within
seven years, the label is ultimately the decision-maker in scheduling
these releases.131 Yet, there is no limit on the number of options a
label can include in a recording contract, thus, a label is free to include upwards of five option periods, fully knowing the contract
could never be completed within the seven year frame.132 Although
artists are, of course, free to enter into recording contracts, labels
have much more industry-knowledge than new artists signing their
first-ever recording deal, who have very little experience and al-

126

See supra Part I.A.3; see also Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45.
See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
128
Id.
129
See, e.g., Vanhorn, supra note 52 (quoting Courtney Love—“I don’t care what the
[industry] says to you today; they lied to you . . . I cannot make seven albums in seven
years. They will not let me.”—and LeAnn Rimes—“At 12, I was thrilled to sign my
contract with Curb Records . . . just turned 19 last month, and if I record at a rate of one
album every two years, which is the industry average, I will be 35 before the contract is
over.”).
130
FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][c].
131
Vanhorn, supra note 52.
132
See id.
127
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most no bargaining power or control over the working relationship.133
C. The Seven Year Rule, De Haviland, and Unconscionability
Before the amendment, California courts applied the Seven
Year Rule to personal service contracts in the music industry.134
When artists neared the end of the seven years on their contracts,
they would threaten to leave the label; the labels, fearful of losing
successful artists, would renegotiate these contracts.135 This imbalance of power seemed to weigh entirely in favor of the artists; however, an artist who is still under contract near the end of the seven
years has almost certainly been a financial success for the label.136
As the label alone decides whether to exercise the options after the
initial contract period, and often decides to drop artists who are
unsuccessful,137 those who are able to exert leverage near the end of
a seven-year contract are comparatively few.138 Labels have an interest in keeping their successful artists under contract, just as
Warner Brothers had an interest in retaining rising star Olivia de
Havilland for another six months.139 By holding that the Seven Year
Rule was unequivocally measured in calendar years and not actual
service, the court ensured that studios could not find ways around
section 2855.140

133

According to Dexter Holland of the band The Offspring, recording artists sign these
contracts in good faith, fully intending to honor them. But the record companies know
from experience that it is highly unlikely artists will be able to fulfill their requirements
due to the demands they place on the artists, including touring, video shoots, and other
marketing chores. See Moss, supra note 52.
134
Id.
135
See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
136
Id. (“Although companies do spend vast sums of money signing and marketing
unknown acts, it’s the rare label that holds on to an act that isn’t successful by its second
album.”).
137
See Scamman, supra note 87, at 274.
138
Just as many more albums are released each year than are considered “successful,”
many more artists are signed to labels that never amass popular or critical acclaim. See,
e.g., Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels’ Business Practices, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
29, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/29/news/mn-44202 [http://perma.cc/
6NNG-Q25C] [hereinafter Philips, Recording Stars].
139
See generally De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225 (1944).
140
Id. at 231–34.
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The “unjust enrichment” reasoning behind the 1987 amendment is analogous to the argument that Warner Brothers “discovered” Ms. de Havilland and produced movies that made her famous. They found her roles and financially backed her projects. They
were a pivotal player in her success. Still, the court found, they
were not entitled to bind her to service for an indefinite length of
time.141 Even though the studio had made apparent investments,
financial and otherwise, in her career, that investment did not entitle Warner Brothers to lengthen her seven-year contract.142 The
California legislature originally enacted section 2855 (and earlier,
section 1980 of the Civil Code)143 “to protect against involuntary
servitude in the form of unconscionable employment agreements.”144 Yet, the California legislature essentially sanctioned involuntary servitude with the passage of section 2855(b): artists are
forced to continue working for their labels indefinitely,145 because
any future profits made under a new label for the unproduced albums on the original contract would be owed to the old label as
damages.146 It is, of course, highly unlikely that a new label will sign
an artist whose profits are owed to a different label.
Musicians believe the amendment “plainly discriminates”
against artists in their industry, as “recording contracts” are the
only named exception in the statute.147 In opposing the 1987
amendment, the “artistic community was extremely upset . . . as it
saw its rights under the seven year rule watered down” by such a
potentially large penalty.148 Because the threat of monetary damag141

Id. at 233–34.
Id.
143
See supra Part I.
144
Gardner, supra note 103, at 727 (citing Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital
Distribution on the Duration of Recording Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42
(2003)); see also Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of
Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 739, 747 (2003).
145
The “indefiniteness” of this contract term relates to the length of time only, as the
contract would end definitely when the final album on the contract was delivered.
146
See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19.
147
See Toomey, supra note 52; see also CAL. LAB. CODE. § 2855(b) (2014).
148
Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[2][a][vii]; see also Philips, Lawmakers, supra note
42 (“‘It’s unfathomable to me how the record companies were able to secure an
exemption to single out one class of people, namely musical artists, to be unprotected by
California labor law,’ [singer Don] Henley said. ‘How can everybody else be protected
but us?’”).
142
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es is enough to keep an artist tethered to the contract, musicians
argue that the statute promotes unconscionable contracts that essentially leave the artist no other option, financially, but to perform.149
III. FIXING THE MUSICIAN EXEMPTION
Currently, the wording of section 2855(b) is vague and ambiguous. Without judicial review, there is little guidance for interpreting exactly how to calculate the damages it entitles labels to receive. Through reform, the California legislature could protect
both the record labels from unjust enrichment when lucrative artists reap the benefits of label management, and allow musicians to
seek nonenforcement of a contract that has been unfairly constructed to keep them under the label’s control for longer than the
Seven Year Rule allows. However, it is worth noting that each of
these potential solutions is only possible through collective action
of artists and other music industry players. A push in 2001–2002
showed signs of momentum towards repealing section 2855(b) and
securing other improvements for musicians, including the exploration of forming a labor union for recording artists,150 however,
these efforts ultimately failed.151
A. Amend Section 2855(b)
1. Limitations at Contract Formation
Without considering the feasibility for parties to fulfill contractual obligations within the seven-year timeframe, the California legislature took away the protections of the Seven Year Rule for musicians by inserting monetary penalties.152 One potential amendment
149

See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 16 (“Recording artists have alleged
that the industry’s position imposes involuntary servitude, which exists when the victim
has ‘no available choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction.’”) (quoting United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942–43 (1988)).
150
See Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138.
151
Chuck Philips, Bill on Free Agency for Artists Dies, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/16/business/fi-7year16 [http://perma.cc/KGW28MPV] [hereinafter Philips, Bill on Free Agency].
152
See Vanhorn, supra note 52.
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to section 2855(b) could include a limit on the total number of albums number or number of option terms permitted in a recording
contract. The current section 2855(b)(3) does not limit the number
of records the parties can contract for, however, it gives the labels
free range to collect damages for all records that are unproduced
when an artist seeks to end the relationship, even after the seven
year limit has lapsed.153
One possible way to limit the length of the contract term during
contract formation would be to institute a “maximum album” provision, prohibiting contracting above a set number of albums within
the seven-year period that are simply not feasible to produce.154
Imposing a limitation on the total number of albums required in a
contract to three or four total albums would “allow recording artists’ contracts to operate better within the bounds of section
2855.”155 A maximum number of contractually required albums
would address the music industry’s concerns in lobbying for
amendment in continuing to provide the opportunity to recover
damages for unproduced albums, however, it would also make the
“artist’s delivery of all the contractual albums a reasonable expectation.”156
Although the inclusion of an upper limit on the number of albums would certainly lead to more realistic contracts, this solution
is not ideal. First, it is likely a shortsighted fix: there is no way to
predict that the future sale of music will be predicated on album
production, the way it is today. If the industry dictates a different
dominant method of music delivery (for example, perhaps only
with the creation and release of singles, rather than entire albums),
the law will be slow to adapt and will create additional contract
formation issues. Further, a limitation based on the industry right
now will fail to account for differences in production that occur in
the future; if artists and labels are able to produce albums more
quickly, or if the industry emphasis on touring continues to in153

See supra Part II.B.
See Note, supra note 60, at 2650–52 (suggesting a reduction in the number of
contractually required albums so the artist and label have a more realistic possibility of
performing the contract’s terms).
155
Id. at 2652.
156
Id.
154
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crease and lengthens the average time between albums, the provision would be of very little help. Additionally, the insertion of a
“maximum album” provision requires the legislature to play expert in a field in which it likely knows very little. It would likely be
very difficult for the legislature to decide the exact number for a
statutory limit simply by weighing competing testimony and information, as mere trends in the industry are not inclusive of all musicians and their labels’ agreements.
Another option is a limitation on the number of total option periods in a contract. If the legislature imposed a limit on these options to enable them to more reasonably be completed within seven
years, artists would be able to end their contractual obligations
sooner and reenter the market as free agents. Still, much like the
potential problems created by a “maximum album” provision, a
“maximum options” provision would likely be problematic. A legislature-created statutory maximum could stifle the industry, lessen
the freedom of these parties to create contracts, and force legal solutions to future problems based on current information.
2. Define “Damages”
As discussed above in Part II.A, section 2855(b) does not define
the “damages” it allows the label to recover for “each phonorecord” the artist under contract fails to deliver.157 Given that this
number is incredibly speculative, labels are able to set the amount
of damages using whatever calculation is most advantageous. Thus,
labels often seek damages in the form of lost profits, based on the
“expected profits on the additional albums that artists have neither
delivered nor created,”158 often a much higher number than the
actual loss incurred in financing the artist’s career.159 Although labels claim that the loss of profit is appropriate given the investment
in the artist and the financial necessity for the label to recover on

157

CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014).
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 17.
159
This is a logical conclusion based on the fact that the label would not wish to keep an
artist long-term if the artist was not profitable. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the
label’s costs associated with that artist outweigh the potential revenue it seeks to generate
from that artist.
158
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the potentially lucrative unproduced albums,160 it is often impossible to calculate a justifiable figure upon which to base an estimate.
The following example of Alanis Morissette illustrates the difficulty in predicting album sales for an artist:
[W]hat if [she] left her label after seven years and
still owed the company four albums? It’s unclear
whether the company would be allowed to base the
value of damages on her 30-million selling hit,
“Jagged Little Pill,” or her follow-up, “Supposed
Former Infatuation Junkie,” which sold just 2 million copies.161
Even if an artist has a sizeable sales track record from which to
base an estimate of future earnings, the growing popularity of
streaming services makes reasonable predictions of album sales increasingly difficult.162 California law requires that the process of
computing damages be “reasonable.” Without a justifiable way to
determine how to estimate the potential lost profit from unproduced albums, “[t]he process of estimating lost profits would
therefore be unreasonably speculative.”163
Although “lost profits” does not seem to yield a reasonable
calculation of damages, actual damages, or “actual artist investment,” which might include only the advances paid to the artist
and other recoupable expenditures incurred by the label,164 is not
much better. If artists are liable for paying back the recoupable
costs of making their album, they will find themselves in the same
situation they are currently in: tethered to contracts because they
160

See Note, supra note 60, at 2646 (“A small number of successful albums fuel the
record industry, both making it profitable and allowing companies to invest in new
artists.”).
161
See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
162
Through streaming services and Internet radio, consumers are listening to music all
the time: in the first half of 2015, listeners streamed over 1.03 trillion songs. See Peoples,
supra note 101 (citing Data to Date: The Rapid Rise of Social and Streaming, NEXT BIG
SOUND, https://www.nextbigsound.com/industryreport/2015summer [http://perma.cc/
M9EH-AZ39] (last visited Nov. 9, 2015)). The massive popularity of streaming services
highlights the need to monetize these streams at appropriate royalty rates, which is a
slowly-evolving process. See id.
163
See Note, supra note 60, at 2646.
164
Id. at 2647–48.
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are unable to crawl out of debt. The artist is in no better a position
to determine the potential success of an album than the label is;
artists do not often know they are creating and recording an album
that will not sell any more than a label knows it is marketing and
promoting a flop. As the parties embark on that risk together, it is
unfair to penalize the artist alone for an album that does not recoup
its production expenses, as these costs alone are typically prohibitively high enough to keep the artist (whose album has not generated enough royalties to be profitable, given the artist’s position)
bound to the label.
A fair damage award would only allow the label to recover for
advances paid or costs incurred for an album that was never recorded.165 In this scenario, an artist would be responsible for repaying money given to produce an album that was not delivered. Although this option may also leave artists without recourse to leave
the label, depending on the artist’s finances, it produces a more
equitable outcome. Labels will be protected against spending money on projects whose revenue they will lose, and artists will not be
able to keep money for a project they wish to take elsewhere.166 By
limiting damages only to advances and costs for the undelivered albums, the amendment would not likely retain its current power to
allow labels to threaten expensive, time consuming, and intimidating lawsuits.167 Thus, the legislature must use language in section
2855(b)(3) to specify that “the party damaged by the failure shall
have the right to recover damages for each phonorecord as to
which that party has failed to render service” no greater than the
actual costs incurred in production of the undelivered phonorecords.
B. Repeal Section 2855(b)
Over the past twenty-five years, artists have unsuccessfully attempted to lobby the California legislature to repeal section 2855(b)
165

See id. at 2847–48.
See id. Additionally, this limit will address the concerns of a spokesperson for the
RIAA, who stated in 2001, when the amendment was gaining significant challengers:
“There is not going to be sympathy for [artists] when they take multimillion-dollar
advances from the companies and then just walk away before they fulfill the obligations in
their contracts.” See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42.
167
See ARTIFACT, supra note 92.
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to eliminate the music industry amendments.168 The California legislature held hearings in 2001 to reexamine the issue and drafted
Senate Bill 1246 to repeal the amendment, however, it was dropped
the following year at the request of the artists’ representatives and
would not likely have passed.169 The legislature instructed the artists’ representatives to reach a compromise on the bill with the major record labels, but compromise was never reached and the California legislature has not revisited the issue.170
Observers of these movements have made convincing arguments to repeal section 2855(b) in order to grant musicians the
same protection as other artists in the entertainment field:
Section 2855(b) permits record labels to take part in
practices that conflict with the doctrines of unconscionability and involuntary servitude. By allowing
the labels to sue for breach of long-term recording
agreements, section 2855(b) assists in the creation
of unconscionable duration periods and helps force
the artist into involuntary servitude with the threat
of damages. Record companies with vast resources
may continue to press for settlement in important
cases they fear they may lose to keep these issues
safe from judicial review.
Of course, an artist should not be able to just walk away from a
contractual agreement—it would be disastrous for a company to
lose the millions it invested in a new artist . . . [but artists] are simply asking that they be treated like every other creative artist that is
subject to the Seven Year Statute.171
Advocates of repeal argue that the elimination of section
2855(b) would reinstate a system of free agency in the music industry.172 Without a damages provision specifically targeting the music
168

See, e.g., Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138 (describing a wave of activism by
recording artists in the early 2000s: exploring the possibility of a labor union, lobbying
Congress to look into business practices of major labels, and a Courtney Love lawsuit
seeking non-enforcement of her contract); Vanhorn, supra note 52.
169
See Philips, Bill on Free Agency, supra note 151.
170
Id.
171
See Gardner, supra note 103, at 756.
172
Id.
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industry, recording artists would “enjoy[] the same rights as all
other citizens,” and “there would be a reasonable opportunity for
them to receive fair-market compensation for their services.”173
Further, others argue that repealing the amendment would encourage the industry to adapt its practices to reflect new trends and
technology: without the monetary leverage that section 2855(b)(3)
provides labels, “[t]he industry’s business model is going to have
to change . . . [the labels are] going to have to be more judicious in
signing new artists, cut down on the expensive videos and other
marketing costs, and they’re going to have to rethink signing way
too many megastars.”174 Adherents to this argument believe that
labels will be forced to enter into contracts more carefully, potentially reducing labels’ ability to take chances on the many unprofitable artists by relying on their superstars to make up the difference,
as currently only a very small number of a label’s acts are actually
profitable.175 Although successful artists would likely view this
change as positive, label executives warn that it would decrease opportunities for new entrants and would harm the industry as a
whole: “companies would have no incentive to underwrite the
risky enterprise” in which only a small number of albums actually
turn a profit.176
This argument seems outdated in a world where recording artists have an opportunity to gain fans and popularity without the
assistance (both in expertise and money) of a major label. Although
173

Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19.
Greg Kot, You Say You Want A Revolution, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2002),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-24/news/0202240354_1_recording-artistscoalition-recording-industry-universal-music-group [http://perma.cc/4XVS-T6M7] (quoting
Michael Nathanson, a music analyst).
175
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 103, at 734 (“Because of the high failure rate of
released albums, record companies absorb great losses on most albums . . . .”) (citing
Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on the Entertainment Industry, 2001 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2001) (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of Sound Recordings,
AFTRA)); Note, supra note 60, at 2645 (“[T]here is a greater than ninety-percent chance
that any given artist’s release will be unprofitable.”); Toomey, supra note 52 (“[T]he
music industry in America is fundamentally broken. In 1999, less than 1 percent of the
total number of albums released sold more than 10,000 copies.”) (citing David Segal,
They Sell Songs the Whole World Sings: Mass Merchants Offer Convenience, Less Choice,
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2001), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-419720.html
[http://perma.cc/7W8G-NLXU]).
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See Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138.
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it may be true that labels in the past “ha[d] to invest $750,000 to
$1 million per act” before they knew if they would make a profit,177
there exist other avenues and mediums now that may assist labels
in determining whether an act will be successful before he or she is
signed. As younger fan bases access music more and more easily
over the Internet, channels like YouTube have become more and
more important. Take, for example, pop star Justin Bieber: although recent antics may make him easier to discount, he has sold
millions of records178 and is the epitome of a new age star, backed
by social media and tech-savvy fans.179 Yet, he didn’t go to open
mic nights or send tapes to labels, hoping to be found; at twelve,
Bieber began uploading videos of himself on YouTube, and as they
became more and more popular on the site, industry professionals
sought him out—not the other way around.180 As hopeful producers engaged in a bidding war to win him to their labels,181 Bieber’s
establishment on social media sites like YouTube gave him credibility that made investing in him a less risky endeavor.
Additionally, artists have other opportunities today through alternate career paths. Lennon and Maisy Stella, now sixteen and
twelve years old, respectively, are Canadian sisters who also gained
fame on YouTube.182 After posting a cover of Robyn’s “Call Your
Girlfriend” in May 2012, the video “went viral,” and that fall, the
177

Id.
Glenn Peoples, Justin Bieber’s “Baby” With New Steaming Data Beats Out Elton
John For RIAA’s Top Platinum Single of All Time, BILLBOARD (May 17, 2013, 11:26 AM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1562681/justin-biebersbaby-with-new-streaming-data-beats-out [http://perma.cc/84QC-CJXX].
179
As of October 2015, Justin Bieber has over 68 million followers on Twitter, see Justin
Bieber (@JustinBieber), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/justinbieber [http://perma.cc/
NLP8-WRDS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2015), and over 40 million followers on Instagram, see
Justin Bieber (@JustinBieber), INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/justinbieber
[http://perma.cc/3KRQ-5ZCL] (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). His fans are called
“Beliebers” and often mobilize on social media cites, namely Twitter, to support and
promote him. See NEVER SAY NEVER (Paramount Pictures 2011).
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(Nov. 14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/teen-pop-star-justin-bieberdiscovered-youtube/story?id=9068403 [http://perma.cc/8R9C-BTQ8].
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girls began to appear on the ABC drama “Nashville.”183 Although
it may be easy to assume the video landed the girls the role, they
were actually cast before the video was posted; because they are
Canadian, they needed to establish a portfolio for their visas, and
the millions of views on the video allowed them to earn these visas
more easily.184 Despite their growing fan base, the girls are currently unsigned by a label and are releasing music through the show’s
soundtracks.185
The Stella sisters join a number of actors and actresses starring
in musical shows and movies, whose recording careers launch
through soundtrack and compilation records, rather than through
typical recording contracts.186 Thus, with more extensive opportunities to predict the potential success of a musician’s career in a
digitally dominated marketplace with evidence of that performer’s
pre-label success on sites like YouTube, Vevo, SoundCloud, and
others, labels can continue to take “risks” on new artists, as these
risks can be more sophistically calculated.187 Still, even if acquiring,
183
See Jaimie Etkin, Lennon And Maisy Stella Talk “Nashville,” Connie Britton, Sisterly
Bonding, Fashion And More, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2012, 9:15 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/17/lennon-and-maisy-stellanashville_n_1975186.html [http://perma.cc/MW4N-4JCZ].
184
“Nashville” Duo Lennon & Maisy Talk TV Stardom, Writing New Music And Trying to
Make Friends At School, MUSIC TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.musictimes.
com/articles/18253/20141205/nashville-duo-lennon-maisey-talk-tv-stardom-writingnew-music-youtube-viral-call-your-girlfriend-christmas-coming-home.htm
[http://perma.cc/P5U3-5GYP].
185
See Nashville Soundtrack, BIG MACH. LABEL GRP., http://www.bigmachine
labelgroup.com/artist/nashville-soundtrack [http://perma.cc/J4ME-XL4C] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015).
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http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6494765/rewinding-the-chartsin-2006-high-school-musical-started [http://perma.cc/32MB-3JBE] (discussing the
effect of 2006 Disney Channel movie High School Musical on the career of its star, and on
subsequent music-centric shows, like Disney’s Hannah Montana and Fox’s Glee); Ed
Masley, For “Glee” fans, the Journey is Worth it for Launch of Live Tour, USATODAY
(May 17, 2010, 10:24 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/music/reviews/201005-16-gleeonline17_N.htm [http://perma.cc/3SDM-LQ3E] (reviewing the launch of a
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Despite the problematic effects of streaming on album sales and royalty collection,
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marketing, producing, and promoting music of new talent remains
as difficult as it ever was, the law should not protect the label at the
expense of the artist. Labels have always employed strategies for
predicting a new artist’s potential success, and plenty of hopeful
musicians go unsigned each year. Therefore, the legislature should
not consider it a detriment that labels may take fewer risks on unknown musicians, but rather, as a positive of repeal: if labels are not
guaranteed to keep their best-selling artists for an indefinite length
of time, they will be forced to scout new talent more wisely. As
Courtney Love pointed out in 2001: “How do the guys running
these labels get away with a 95% failure rate that would be totally
unacceptable in any other type of business?”188
Although there may be an element of unjust enrichment for artists who gain popularity and financial success with a label and then
leave it, no other industry’s employers are protected from this possibility. If they were, every employer that hires an entry-level employee who eventually achieves promotion within the company, as
a result of his or her job training and experience, could sue the employee for damages for the “investment” made in training, or “future earnings” that employee might generate for the company.189
tracking an artist’s popularity on social media sites, the number of times an artist’s song
or video is played on streaming services, and the number of views on an artist’s Wikipedia
page. Id. The availability of this data represents a major strategic benefit to “music
makers, labels and marketers looking for data and insights about artists and their fans.”
See About Next Big Sound, NEXT BIG SOUND, https://www.nextbigsound.com/about
[http://perma.cc/7YQ6-VV5B] (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
188
Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138.
189
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able, in the same way as labels in the music industry, to recover damages for any
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appear on the show, lest they be sued for the predicted future losses sustained by the
producers by ending the performer’s contract. In this scenario, it would be incredibly
difficult to calculate the potential loss to the producers from the star’s absence. Would
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medical drama E.R. lasted fifteen seasons? See About ER & Cast Bios, NBC,
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2015). The television industry is an interesting comparison to the music industry, as the
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Rather, labels, like employers in other industries, would need to
focus on their relationships with their artist-employees to encourage them to continue the business relationship. Additionally, artists
would be free to renegotiate a new contract with their label as the
contract neared the end of the term, but the label would need to
pay according to their value in the market.190 The production of
each album remains a financial risk, even for well-established musicians,191 and labels who develop positive and personal relationships
and seek to renegotiate their star musicians’ contracts would almost certainly have an advantage in the free market over other labels.
Without section 2855(b), artists would be free to leave and
work with others after the term is over, and labels would be forced
to create contracts that can feasibly be produced in the time frame.
Further, even without section 2855(b), the law would continue to
protect the labels in the event an artist does not fulfill, or reasonably attempt to fulfill, his or her obligations: if an artist is required to
deliver three albums on a schedule set by the contract, but fails to
do so within seven years at his or her own fault, the label retains the
ability to sue the artist on a bad faith breach of contract claim.
CONCLUSION
Repealing section 2855(b) is the most effective way to balance
in bargaining power in music industry contract negotiations, and to
restore the rights under section 2855(a), the Seven Year Rule, that
stars of the ABC comedy Modern Family had so much bargaining power, they incorrectly
claimed their contracts were illegal and void simply because their contracts contained
option periods that could have extended their terms beyond seven years. See RAMER, supra
note 19, at 4. Still, perhaps seeking to avoid prolonged legal trouble, the network
renegotiated these contracts within days and the lawsuit was withdrawn. Id. Of course,
the fact that a contract could last beyond seven years does not make the contract illegal
and void; rather, after the seven years has ended, a party is permitted to seek nonenforcement of it. See id. at 3–4; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(a) (2014).
190
See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19. But see RAMER, supra note 19, at 4–
5 (noting that a renegotiation contract, beyond the seven year mark, should have a “lag”
day in which the artist is technically not under contract at all, as that day would restart the
seven year stopwatch and would allow the artist the freedom to sign elsewhere if he or she
so chooses).
191
See supra note 161 and accompanying example of Alanis Morissette’s album sales.
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musicians lost in 1987. It is unlikely, however, that artists will see
section 2855(b) repealed without strong collective action. Lobbying
the California legislature as a unit and testifying on exact contract
terms, compensation, and industry practices can present a convincing argument for repeal. Without unity, however, artists will see
these actions dismantled, as they did in 2002.192 Thus, artists may
be better served by focusing efforts first on the establishment of a
union, guild, or other professional association, allowing artists to
bargain collectively and more effectively against unfair statutes that
enable unconscionable contract enforcement.

192

See supra text accompanying note 169.

